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Abstract—Over the past few years, detection performance im-
provements of deep-learning based steganalyzers have been usu-
ally achieved through structure expansion. However, excessive ex-
panded structure results in huge computational cost, storage over-
heads, and consequently difficulty in training and deployment.
In this paper we propose CALPA-NET, a ChAnneL-Pruning-
Assisted deep residual network architecture search approach to
shrink the network structure of existing vast, over-parameterized
deep-learning based steganalyzers. We observe that the broad
inverted-pyramid structure of existing deep-learning based ste-
ganalyzers might contradict the well-established model diversity
oriented philosophy, and therefore is not suitable for steganalysis.
Then a hybrid criterion combined with two network pruning
schemes is introduced to adaptively shrink every involved con-
volutional layer in a data-driven manner. The resulting network
architecture presents a slender bottleneck-like structure. We have
conducted extensive experiments on BOSSBase+BOWS2 dataset,
more diverse ALASKA dataset and even a large-scale subset
extracted from ImageNet CLS-LOC dataset. The experimental
results show that the model structure generated by our proposed
CALPA-NET can achieve comparative performance with less
than two percent of parameters and about one third FLOPs
compared to the original steganalytic model. The new model
possesses even better adaptivity, transferability, and scalability.
Index Terms—steganalysis, steganography, deep learning, con-
volutional neural network, network pruning.
I. Introduction
STEGANALYSIS aims to detect covert communicationestablished via steganography. In addition to detection
performance, computational cost, model complexity, as well
as adaptivity, transferability, and scalability, are all important
considerations for a real-world steganalytic framework.
Over the last decade, the main battleground of the war
between modern steganography and steganalysis has always
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been in digital images [1]. Most of the spatial-domain
and frequency-domain image steganographic algorithms have
adopted the embedding distortion minimizing framework [2].
The prominent additive embedding distortion minimizing
schemes include HILL [3] and MiPOD [4] in spatial domain,
as well as UERD [5] in JPEG domain. UNIWARD [6] is a
benchmarking cross-domain scheme (noted as S-UNIWARD
in spatial domain, while J-UNIWARD in JPEG domain).
In recent years, deep-learning frameworks, especially Con-
volutional Neural Networks (CNNs) have achieved over-
whelming superiority [7]. In the meanwhile, from early
AlexNet [8] and VGGNet [9], to later Inception models [10]
and ResNet [11], the literature witnessed deep-learning frame-
works have become more and more deeper and complicated.
The once overlord of image steganalysis is the “rich model”
hand-crafted features family [12]–[16] equipped with an en-
semble classifier [17]. Started from the work of Tan and
Li [18], breakthroughs were made in deep-learning based
steganalysis [19]–[21]. Then Ye et al. proposed a deep-learning
based steganalyzer equipped with a new activation function
called Truncated Linear Unit (TLU) [22], achieving significant
improvement in spatial domain. In JPEG domain, Chen et al.
proposed a specific deep-learning based steganalyzer aware of
JPEG phase [23]. Xu proposed a novel 20-layer framework
with residual connections (named XuNet2) [24]. Aiming at
large-scale JPEG image steganalysis, Zeng et al. proposed
a generic hybrid deep-learning framework incorporating the
domain knowledge behind rich steganalytic models [25]. On
the contrary, Boroumand et al. proposed a deep residual
steganalytic network designed to minimize the use of heuristic
domain knowledge (named SRNet) [26], which has shown
superior detection performance for both spatial domain and
JPEG domain steganography. In [27], Zeng et al. explicitly
considered the correlation among color bands and proposed
WISERNet, the wider separate-then-reunion network specif-
ically designed for steganalysis of true-color images. For a
comprehensive survey please refer to [28].
It has been widely acknowledged that existing deep-learning
frameworks are over parameterized, and are therefore with
huge computational cost and storage overheads. Consequently,
they are more likely to require massive amounts of training
data to achieve good performance, and are hard to deploy [29].
As also discussed in [28], automatic network architecture
searching techniques [30] might be potential to build up an
effective deep-learning framework. Another trend is network
pruning, which is one of the most popular methods to re-
duce network complexity. Network pruning has become one
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2important research problem even since a very early stage of
the evolution of deep-learning frameworks [31]. For CNNs,
state-of-the-art network pruning approaches can be classified
into two categories, the non-structured weights pruning and
the channel-based structured pruning methods. Non-structured
weights pruning methods [32] cannot lead to complexity re-
duction without the support of dedicated hardware. Therefore
structured pruning methods are more practical. Hu et al.
proposed a channel pruning method based on the percentage
of zeros in the outputs [33]. Li et al. proposed another channel
pruning method based on the l1 norms of the corresponding
filter weights [34]. Luo et al. proposed ThiNet which greedily
prunes those channels with smallest effects on the activation
values of the next layer [35]. Further on, Huang and Wang
used sparsity regularization to prune channels and even coarser
structures, such as residual blocks [36]. The works mentioned
above are just the notable ones selected from a complete
collection. But, whatever the approach, the existing network
pruning approaches have all followed a typical three-stage
pipeline: training, pruning, and then finetuning in order to
preserve a set of inherited learned important weights.
In this paper, we propose CALPA-NET, a channel-pruning-
assisted deep residual network architecture search approach
to shrink the network structure of existing vast, over-
parameterized deep-learning based steganalyzers. We observe
that the established “doubling the number of channels along
with halving the size of output feature maps” rule might
undermine the diversity of output features of deep stegana-
lytic models. Therefore starting from existing bloated deep
steganalytic models, CALPA-NET utilizes a hybrid criterion to
adaptively determine the number of channels of every involved
convolutional layer. The proposed hybrid criterion combines
the ThiNet scheme [35] and the l1-norm based scheme [34].
Please note that CALPA-NET, where we abandon the training-
pruning-finetuning pipeline of typical network pruning meth-
ods, is entirely different from network pruning approaches
mentioned above since the proposed channel pruning criterion
is just used to search efficient network architectures. The
extensive experiments conducted on public datasets show
that even trained from scratch, the shrunken model can still
achieve state-of-the-art detection performance with merely a
tiny proportion of parameters and much lower computational
complexity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sect. II
firstly gives a brief overview of existing representative deep
steganalytic models as well as channel-based structured prun-
ing methods. Then experimental testimonies are provided to
support the rationale of CALPA-NET. Next the procedure with
our proposed hybrid channel pruning criterion used in CALPA-
NET is described in detail. Results of experiments conducted
on public datasets are presented in Sect. III. Finally, we make
a conclusion in Sect. IV.
II. Our proposed CALPA-NET
A. Preliminaries
As far as we know, existing deep-learning based stegan-
alyzers are all based on CNNs (Convolutional Neural Net-
work). The principal part of CNN can be modeled as a
direct graph of alternating convolutional layers and auxiliary
layers (e.g. BN (Batch Normalization) layers and pooling
layers). Convolutional layers are the central components of
a CNN since they contain the overwhelming majority of
learnable weights and biases. For a given convolutional layer
Ll, it takes an after-activation input tensor Ẑ
l−1 ∈ RJl−1×Hl−1×W l−1
which possesses Jl−1 input channels with height Hl−1 and
width W l−1, convolves it with Wl ∈ RJl−1×Kl×W l×W l , a filter
tensor consisting of Jl−1 × Kl kernels with size W l ×W l, and
generates Zl ∈ RKl×Hl×W l , the corresponding before-activation
output tensor which has Kl output channels (feature maps)
with height Hl and width W l. The convolution operation can
be modeled as (the bias is omitted for brevity):
Zlk:: =
Jl−1∑
j=1
Ẑ
l−1
j:: ∗Wljk::, 1 ≤ k ≤ Kl (1)
where Ẑ
l−1
j:: , W
l
jk::, and Z
l
k:: denotes the slides, the two dimen-
sional sections defined by fixing all but the last two indices,
of Ẑ
l−1
, Wl, and Zl, respectively.
1) Interior structures of deep-learning based steganalyzers:
Two popular deep-learning based steganalyzers, SRNet [26]
and XuNet2 [24] are taken as examples. Their conceptual
structures are illustrated in Fig. 1. The two deep-learning
based steganalyzers both take spatial representation of the
target image as input. All deep-learning based steganalyzers
can be divided into three modules: the bottom module aiming
at extracting the so-called “stego noise residuals”, the middle
module which striving for learning compact representative
features and the top module which is a simple binary classifier.
Actually most of the existing research works regarding
to deep-learning based steganalyzers have been devoted to
the bottom module. The bottom module of XuNet2 adopts
a particular truncated filter bank with sixteen 4×4 DCT high-
pass filters. Further on, the bottom module of SRNet consists
of a pile of two hierarchical convolutional layers (“L1” and
“L2”, following the notations in [26]) and five unpooled
residuals blocks with direct shortcut connections (from “L3” to
“L7”) for extraction of noise residuals. Conversely, according
to our best knowledge, no specific domain knowledge has ever
been introduced to guide the design of the middle module
as well as the top module. Researchers just simply followed
the effective recipes in other research fields (e.g. computer
vision). Nowadays, almost all of the state-of-the-art deep-
learning based steganalyzers, including SRNet and XuNet2,
have adopted shortcut connections inspired by ResNet [11]
and a simple design rule— “doubling the number of channels
along with halving the spatial size of feature maps” which can
be traced back to VGGNet [9]. Take SRNet for instance. As
shown in Fig. 1, from “L3” up to “L11” are with shortcut
connections. From its “L9” up to “L12”, the doubling num-
bers of output channels (64, 128, 256, and 512) correspond
respectively to the halving sizes of feature maps (128 × 128,
64 × 64, 32 × 32, and 16 × 16).
2) Channel pruning methods: ThiNet and l1-norm based:
Since the training-pruning-finetuning pipeline of typical net-
work pruning methods is completed abandoned in CALPA-
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Fig. 1. From left to right, the conceptual structures of CALPA-XuNet2, XuNet2, SRNet, and CALPA-SRNet* are illustrated respectively. The number and
corresponding shrinking rate of output channels of every convolutional layer is shown alongside the representing bar. For SRNet and CALPA-SRNet, blue
“L1” to “L12” represent twelve composition blocks following the notations in [26].
* The shrinking rates of CALPA-XuNet2 and CALPA-SRNet are aiming at detecting J-UNIWARD stego images with 0.4 bpnzAC payload and QF 75.
NET, only the pruning criteria in ThiNet [35] and the l1-norm
based scheme [34] are addressed.
ThiNet [35] is a data-driven channel selection algorithm.
For a pre-defined pruning rate γ, a subset of m images are
randomly selected from training set and fed to a trained CNN
model one by one. Fed with every image in the subset, the
input and output tensors of all the convolutional layers of
the CNN model are obtained in a forward propagation. In
ThiNet, in order to prune a given convolutional layer Ll, we
have to observe its impact on the next layer Ll+1. Given
a specific convolutional layer Ll+1, n elements are further
randomly sampled from Zl+1. Therefore a set with m˜ = m× n
samples (namely, there are m images, and each image provides
n elements for Ll+1) is obtained. We introduce a new index t
to traverse those m˜ elements, and denote the corresponding
subset of filters in Wl+1 as Wl+1,t ∈ RJl×W l+1×W l+1 , 1 ≤ t ≤ m˜,
and receptive fields 1 in Ẑ
l
as R̂
l,t ∈ RJl×W l+1×W l+1 , 1 ≤ t ≤ m˜.
What proposed in ThiNet is actual a greedy solution of the
following optimization problem:
argmin
T
m˜∑
t=1
∑
j∈T
R̂
l,t
j:: ∗Wl+1,tj::
2
1The region of the input space that is relative to the unit we are taking into
consideration.
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Fig. 2. Illustration of ThiNet algorithm (Eq. (2)) via a toy example.
4s.t. |T | = Jl · γ, T ⊂ {1, 2, · · · , Jl} (2)
in which |T | denotes the number of selected indexes in T ,
and R̂
l,t
j::, W
l+1,t
j:: denote the j-th slide of R̂
l,t
and Wl+1,t.
Those Ẑ
l
j:: with indexes fall in T are categorized as “weak
channels” and are pruned. The corresponding before-activation
slides {Zlj::, j ∈ T } are implicated, and are pruned as well.
Consequently, the corresponding filters {Wl: j::, j ∈ T } which
generate {Zlj::, j ∈ T } are also pruned. Please note that as three
dimensional sub-tensors, the pruning of {Wl: j::, j ∈ T } results in
cutting down of numerous parameters and FLOPs (FLoating-
point OPerations) in the corresponding convolutions.
Fig. 2 provides a toy example. In this toy example, the
convolutional layer Ll to be pruned contains a before-activation
output tensor Zl with slide number Jl = 5. Therefore Ẑ
l
, the
corresponding after-activation input tensor for the next layer
Ll+1 contains five slides: Ẑ
l
1::, Ẑ
l
2::, Ẑ
l
3::, Ẑ
l
4::, and Ẑ
l
5::. The
next layer Ll+1 only contains Kl+1 = 1 output channel/slide,
corresponding to Zl+11:: . The pre-defined pruning rate γ is set to
40%, which means that two out of the five slides in Ẑ
l
should
be pruned. Only one point/element is randomly sampled from
Zl+11:: , the only one slide of Ll+1 in this toy example. Therefore
Eq.(2) of the manuscript can be simplified to:
argmin
T
∑
j∈T
R̂
l,1
j:: ∗Wl+1,1j::
2 , s.t. |T | = 2, T ⊂ {1, 2, · · · , 5}
From the equation above we can see Wl+1,1j:: = W
l+1
j1::, 1 ≤ j ≤
5, as also denoted in Fig. 2. For every filter, Wl+1j1::, 1 ≤ j ≤ 5,
the corresponding receptive field in Ẑ
l
is R̂
l,1
j:: , 1 ≤ j ≤ 5,
respectively, as marked by dashed boxes in Fig. 2. Since the
`2-norm of R̂
l,1
1:: ∗Wl+1,11:: + R̂
l,1
3:: ∗Wl+1,13:: is minimal, they are
decimated. As a result, Wl+1,11:: and W
l+1,1
3:: are pruned. Two
slides, Ẑ
l
1:: and Ẑ
l
3:: which contain R̂
l,1
1:: and R̂
l,1
3:: are pruned as
well. Though not illustrated in Fig. 2, we should note that in
Ll, Zl1::, Z
l
3::, W
l
:1::, W
l
:3:: are also pruned accordingly.
On the contrary, l1-norm based scheme [34] only considers
the statistical properties of the filters themselves. For a given
convolutional layer Ll, its Kl output channels are traversed.
The l1 norms of the corresponding filters {Wl:k::, 1 ≤ k ≤ Kl}
are calculated and sorted from lowest to highest. For a pre-
defined pruning rate γ, the first Kl · γ filters in the sorted list
are pruned. Those output channels corresponding to the pruned
filters are removed as well.
B. Rationale of our proposed CALPA-NET
How to determine the width (number of output chan-
nels/trainable parameters) in each layer is a well-known open
problem in deep learning literature. As far as we know, in
the field of deep-learning based pattern recognition, there are
no firm principles for determination of layer width given a
fixed amount of computational resources. Therefore we opt to
narrow our focus to deep-learning based image steganalysis.
In the field of image steganalysis, a notable philosophy is
established since the reign of “rich model+ensemble classifier”
solution [12]: model diversity is crucial to success of stegan-
alytic detectors. The adoption of ResNet-style shortcut con-
nections in latest deep-learning based steganalyzers actually
supports the above philosophy since ResNet-style shortcuts
resemble ensemble classifier, as pointed out in [37].
In fact, in the field of deep-learning based pattern recog-
nition, upper-level representations (usually output channels of
upper-level convolutional layers) learned with pre-trained deep
CNNs are widely used as classification feature set [38], [39].
Since deep CNN based steganalysis is one of the subfields
of deep-learning based pattern recognition, it would be rea-
sonable to believe that the argument which makes sense in
steganalytic feature-set construction can also be established for
the mid-level representations of deep-learning based stegana-
lyzers. Therefore, given a deep-learning based steganalyzer,
its upper-level convolutional layer Ll can be regarded as a
features extractor. Its every output channel (feature map) can
be viewed as a generated sub-model and should contains
diverse statistical patterns, according to [12].
From the perspective of time-frequency analysis, those ideal
diverse statistical patterns correspond to sparse intensity fluc-
tuations in nearly non-overlapping frequency subbands. Con-
versely, those strong intensities in the most common frequency
subbands (usually those low-frequency subbands) usually rep-
resent the underlying universal patterns and contribute little to
model diversity. However, as shown below, the experimental
evidence clearly show that the aggregation in convolution
with large enough input channels suppresses sparse intensity
fluctuations as well as heightens strong intensities in low-
frequency subbands.
We take a well-trained SRNet model aiming at detecting
J-UNIWARD stego images with 0.4 bpnzAC payload and
QF 75 for sample. With the 256 × 256 JPEG representation
of BOSSBase image No. 1013 as input, we investigate the
output channels of the second convolutional layer of “Type
3” residual blocks (“L8”, “L9”, “L10”, and “L11”). 2 For
the broader “L11”, we further investigate the intermediate
feature maps before the summation of the representative output
channels.
Fig. 3 shows the heat maps of amplitudes of some represen-
tative two-dimensional Fourier-transformed frequency-domain
output channels for those residual blocks (please enlarge it for
better visual effect). From Fig. 3 we can observe that there
are strong intensities in the most common-frequency/low-
frequency sub-bands of the outputs of the main branch of the
residual blocks. Even for those output channels with drastic
fluctuation, the evidence is obvious.
For “L11”, three output channels of the second convolu-
tional layer are further selected as samples. The left one in
Fig. 3 is with relatively obvious intensity fluctuations in high-
frequency subbands, the middle one only contains energy in
low-frequency sub-bands, while the right one is in somewhere
2Please note that the output channels of the second convolutional layer of
a given “Type 3” residual block, rather than the outputs of the entire residual
block are investigated. This is due to the fact that with shortcut connection,
the outputs of the entire “Type 3” residual block are the summation of the
output channels of the second convolutional layer and the corresponding input
channels of the entire residual block.
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Fig. 3. Amplitudes of the two-dimensional Fourier-transformed output channels (visually represented with heat maps). The investigated target is a well-trained
SRNet model aiming at detecting J-UNIWARD stego images with 0.4 bpnzAC payload and QF 75. The input is BOSSBase image No. 1013. Output channels of
the second convolutional layer of “Type 3” residual blocks (“L8”, “L9”, “L10”, and “L11”) are investigated. For “L11”, we further investigate the intermediate
feature maps before the summation of the representative output channels.
between the two extremes. For every one of the three output
channels, four intermediate feature maps before the summa-
tion are further selected. All of those selected intermediate
feature maps are with obvious intensity fluctuations in high-
frequency subbands. From Fig. 3 we can see that with large
enough input channels, for a given output channel, no matter
how dispersive the resulting intensity fluctuations in it, the
summation/aggregation in convolution of a given filter tensor
do suppress the ever-present sparse intensity fluctuations in
higher-frequency subbands of the intermediate feature maps
generated by involved kernels.
Therefore we can make a straightforward inference that
the broad convolutional layers in the inverted-pyramid style
upper modules of existing deep-learning based steganalyzers
might violate the model diversity oriented philosophy. In
Appendix. A, we provide a theoretical reflection to support
our argument.
C. Detailed algorithm of our proposed CALPA-NET
1) The overall procedure: Our proposed approach is named
CALPA-NET, the ChAnneL-Pruning-Assisted deep residual
NETwork for image steganalysis. “CALPA” is homophonic
with “KALPA”, a Sanskrit word for a never ending loop in
which the universe circularly expands and shrinks. The demon-
stration in Sect. II-B has revealed that the broad inverted-
pyramid structure might be a bloated solution for deep-
learning based steganalyzers. Therefore our target is to shrink
the excessive expanded structure of existing successful deep-
learning based steganalyzers to make them more cost-effective,
as the word “KALPA” implies.
Train the original model N
Analyze the model structure of N
Determine the pruning scheme for every 
inclusive convolutional layer
Traverse N from bottom to up
Determine the shrinking rate for every inclusive 
convolutional layer
Determine the model structure of 
CALPA-N
Shrink the model structure of N with
obtained shrinking rates
Initialize CALPA-N and train it
Fig. 4. The overall CALPA-NET diagram for a given deep-learning based
steganalytic model N.
Recently, an interesting phenomenon that network pruning
can be regarded as one sort of network architecture searching
approach is reported in the field of computer vision [40].
An effective pruned network trained from scratch can show
the performance as good as the one with traditional three-
stage training-pruning-finetuning pipeline. This phenomenon
inspires us to use effective network pruning criteria to de-
termine the most cost-effective architecture for deep-learning
based steganalyzers. The diagram of the overall procedure is
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Fig. 5. The shortcut connections in two types of residual blocks in SRNet.
“⊕” denotes element-wise addition.
shown in Fig. 4. Given a deep-learning based steganalytic
model N, it is trained first using the original training protocol.
At the same time, the structure of N is analyzed. A specific
pruning scheme is determined for every inclusive convolu-
tional layer in the pipeline according to its position in the
pipeline (see Sect. II-C2). Then the well-trained N is traversed
from bottom to top and the shrinking rate for every inclusive
convolutional layer is determined in a data-driven manner.
A brand new model structure is obtained via shrinking the
channels of every inclusive layer with corresponding shrinking
rate (see Sect. II-C3). The resulting model is referred to as
CALPA-N, and is reset and trained from scratch. In this paper,
two representative deep-learning based steganalytic models
are involved: SRNet [26] and XuNet2 [24]. We call the
corresponding CALPA-NET as CALPA-SRNet and CALPA-
XuNet2.
2) The proposed hybrid channel pruning criterion: Un-
fortunately, there is no known channel pruning schemes for
shortcut connections yet. Our preferred channel pruning cri-
terion is the one used in ThiNet [35] due to its simplicity
and efficiency. However, the ThiNet scheme cannot be used in
shortcut connections.
An example from SRNet is given in Fig. 5. Two types of
residual blocks are picked out from Fig. 1. Blocks “L3” and
“L4” with blue background contain direct shortcut connec-
tions, while blocks “L9” and “L10” with pink background
contain transformed shortcut connections. Please note that for
direct shortcut connections, the element-wise addition of the
two relevant convolutional layers demands that the sizes of
the corresponding output tensors, like Z2 and Z4, Z4 and
Z6, should be the same. Further more, all of the relevant
convolutional layers linked via shortcut connections should be
with the same output tensor size. From Fig. 5 it is clear that
the size of Z2, Z4 and Z6 must be the same. For transformed
shortcut connections, each shortcut is equipped with a specific
convolutional layer consisting of 1 × 1 kernels to extend the
size of the shortcut output tensor. Given a main-branch output
tensor Zl, denote the output tensor in the transformed shortcut
connection element-wisely added to it as Zlt. Analogously, the
two convolutional layers relevant to the element-wise addition
in transformed shortcut connections, like Z16 and Z16t , Z
18
and Z18t , should also be the same.
In ThiNet, the pruning in Zl relies on the samples in the
output tensor on top of it. However, the introduction of shortcut
connections implies that Zl may correspond to two or even
more tensors on top of it. As shown in Fig. 5, for direct
shortcut connections, the pruning in Z2 relies on Z3 and Z4,
and Z4 in turns replies on Z5 and Z6. for transformed shortcut
connections, both Z16 and Z16t rely on Z
17 and Z18t . Therefore,
ThiNet is not suitable for shortcut connections. As a result, a
hybrid channel pruning criterion is employed in our proposed
approach:
For those convolutional layers not involved in shortcut
connections, ThiNet scheme is applied to them to determine
the shrinking rates of their output tensors. As demonstrated
in Fig. 5, Z3, Z5, Z15 and Z17 are not involved in shortcut
connections. ThinNet scheme is applied to them and their
shrinking rates are determined according to the output tensors
on top of them, Z4, Z6, Z16 and Z18, respectively.
For those relevant convolutional layers linked via direct
shortcut connections, they are handled altogether with a post-
processing mechanism. l1-norm based scheme [34] is applied
to the output tensor of the lowest convolutional layer and de-
termine its shrinking rate. The same shrinking rate is assigned
to the output tensor of the rest relevant layers. Take SRNet
for example, Z2, Z4, Z6, and even Z8, Z10, Z12 (do not
appear in Fig. 5) are linked via direct shortcut connections.
l1-norm based scheme is applied to Z2, the lowest one. Then
the obtained shrinking rate is assigned to all the linked output
tensors.
For those transformed shortcut connections, the two con-
volutional layers relevant to the element-wise addition in
transformed shortcut connections are handled together. Given a
main-branch output tensor Zl, its shrinking rate is determined
via l1-norm based scheme. The same shrinking rate is assigned
to Zlt, the output tensor in the corresponding transformed
shortcut connection as well. Also take SRNet for example, l1-
norm based scheme is used to determine the shrinking rate of
Z16 and Z18, and then the obtained shrinking rate is assigned
to Z16t and Z
18
t , respectively.
3) Channel-pruning-assisted architecture search: Please
note that in CALPA-NET, channel pruning approaches is used
to assist the determination of the shrinking rate of every
involved convolutional layer. A new term “shrinking rate” is
introduced in order to highlight the difference between our pro-
posed CALPA-NET and existing channel pruning approaches.
Given a convolutional layer Ll with a determined shrinking
rate ζl, the corresponding pruning rate used in channel pruning
approaches is γl = 1 − ζl.
As mentioned in Sect. II-C1, the well-trained model N is
traversed from bottom to top for every inclusive convolutional
layer Ll with shrinking rate undetermined. The detailed algo-
rithm is shown in Algorithm 1.
7Algorithm 1 Shrinking rate determination algorithm for Ll
and all the relevant convolutional layers.
Require: A well-trained model N, a standalone validation
dataset Dv, a pre-defined step  (set to 5% in our ex-
periments), and a tolerable accuracy lost ς (set to 5% in
our experiments).
1: Initialize the pruning rate γl = 0%.
2: Validate N in Dv. Denote the obtained validation accuracy
as Acc0. Let Accp1 = Acc0.
3: loop
4: Set γl = γl + .
5: if Ll is not in shortcut connections then
6: use ThiNet to prune Ll.
7: else
8: use l1-norm based scheme to prune Ll and all
the relevant convolutional layers linked with it via
shortcut connections.
9: end if
10: Let Np denotes the pruned model. Validate Np in Dv
and denote the validation accuracy as Accp2 .
11: if Accp1 − Accp2 > ς then
12: an obvious accuracy decline is observed.
13: break
14: else if Acc0 − Accp2 > ς then
15: the detection accuracy has gradually declined to
beyond the tolerance threshold.
16: break
17: end if
18: Let Accp1 = Accp2 .
19: end loop
20: set γl = γl − , namely roll back to prior pruning rate.
21: Set the corresponding shrinking rate ζl = 100%− γl. If Ll
is in shortcut connections, the shrinking rates of all the
relevant convolutional layers linked with it via shortcut
connections are set to ζl as well.
After the bottom-up traversal, every inclusive convolutional
layer Ll is assigned a determined shrinking rate ζl. The result-
ing CALPA-N model is obtained via shrinking the volume of
Zl, the before-activation output tensor of every inclusive Ll to
RK
l
ζ×Hl×W l , in which Klζ = K
l · ζl. The obtained CALPA-N is
reset and trained from scratch.
III. Experiments
A. Experiment setup
The primary image dataset used in our experiments is the
union of BOSSBase v1.01 [41] and BOWS2 [42]3, each
of which contains 10,000 512 × 512 grayscale spatial im-
ages. All of the images were resized to 256 × 256 using
Matlab® function imresize. The corresponding JPEG images
were further generated with QFs (Quality Factors) 75 and
95. In every experiments, 10,000 BOWS2 images and 4,000
randomly selected BOSSBase images were used for training.
Another 1,000 randomly selected BOSSBase images were
3For a fair comparison, we tried our best to adopt almost the same
experiment setup as which SRNet [26] was evaluated on.
for validation. The remaining 5,000 BOSSBase images were
retained for testing. Furthermore, following the generation
pipeline mentioned in [26], a subset of ImageNet CLS-
LOC [43] dataset with 250,000 grayscale 256 × 256 JPEG
images was also introduced to demonstrate the performance
of CALPA-NET on large-scale dataset under cover source
diversity scenario. ALASKA [44] is another large-scale dataset
introduced to evaluate the performance of CALPA-NET under
stego source diversity scenario. Its JPEG compressed (with QF
75) grayscale 256 × 256 version (v2) was adopted 4.
Four representative steganographic schemes, UERD [5] and
J-UNIWARD [6] for JPEG domain, and HILL [3] and S-
UNIWARD [6] for spatial domain, were our attacking targets
in the experiments. For JPEG steganographic algorithms, the
embedding payloads were set to 0.2 and 0.4 bpnzAC (bits per
non-zero AC DCT coefficient). For spatial domain stegano-
graphic algorithms, the embedding payloads were set to 0.2
and 0.4 bpp (bits per pixel).
XuNet2 [24] and SRNet [26] were selected as the two initial
architectures of our proposed CALPA-NET. Our implementa-
tion of CALPA-NET and its corresponding initial architectures
are based on TensorFlow [45]. Unless otherwise specified,
the two initial architectures were trained with the hyper-
parameters mentioned in the corresponding original papers.
The batch size in the training procedure was set to 32 (namely
16 cover-stego pairs). The maximum number of iterations was
set to 50× 104 for SRNet, and 32× 104 for XuNet2. CALPA-
XuNet2 and CALPA-SRNet adopted the same maximum num-
ber of iterations as their corresponding initial architectures.
Like their corresponding initial architectures, the optimizers
and learning rate schedules used for CALPA-SRNet and
CALPA-XuNet2 were specifically defined as follows: CALPA-
SRNet were trained using Adamax with learning rate starting
from 0.001. After 40 × 104 iterations the learning rate was
reduced to 0.0001. CALPA-XuNet2 was trained using mini-
batch stochastic gradient descent with learning rate starting
from 0.001. The learning rate was set to decrease 10% for
every 5,000 iterations. The momentum was fixed to 0.9.
In each experiment, unless otherwise specified, the model
was validated and saved every one epoch (in primary dataset,
14, 000/16 = 875 iterations). The one with the best validation
accuracy was evaluated on the corresponding testing set. All
of the experiments were conducted on a GPU cluster with
sixteen NVIDIA® Tesla® P100 GPU cards. Bounded by
computational resources, every experiment was repeated three
times, and the mean of the results on testing set were reported.
The source codes and auxiliary materials are available for
download from GitHub 5.
B. Compactness of CALPA-NET
In this section, we take CALPA-SRNet as example to
analyze its compactness and effectiveness.
1) Compactness of CALPA-NET with different ς: In Tab. I,
we compare the effect of different tolerable accuracy lost ς
4http://alaska.utt.fr/ALASKA v2 JPG 256 QF75 GrayScale.sh
5https://github.com/tansq/CALPA-NET
8TABLE I
Effect of different tolerable accuracy lost ς on the parameters, FLOPs, and detection accuracies of CALPA-SRNet. The detection accuracies were
obtained on the stand-alone testing set. The Two training scenarios are compared: “trained from scratch” and “finetuned”. The trained models are aiming at
detecting J-UNIWARD stego images with 0.4 bpnzAC payload and QF 75. The percentages of parameters and FLOPs of CALPA-SRNet compared to original
SRNet are listed in parentheses. For accuracies, the terms in parentheses with preceding ↓ and ↑ denote decrement or increment compared to original SRNet.
Original
SRNet
CALPA-SRNet with a given tolerable accuracy lost ς
2% 5% 10% 20% 50%
Parameters 477.06×104 8.43×104 (1.77%) 6.93×104 (1.45%) 4.71×104 (0.99%) 3.45×104 (0.72%) 2.24×104 (0.47%)
FLOPs 5.95×109 2.29×109 (38.5%) 1.97×109 (33.1%) 1.54×109 (25.9%) 1.37×109 (23.1%) 0.75×109 (12.7%)
Accuracy 92.98%
Trained from scratch
93.12% (↑0.14%) 92.86% (↓0.12%) 92.63% (↓0.35%) 92.36% (↓0.62%) 87.94% (↓5.04%)
Finetuned
93.07% (↑0.09%) 92.8% (↓0.18%) 92.84% (↓0.14%) 92.59% (↓0.39%) 87.63% (↓5.35%)
on the model parameters, FLOPs, and detection accuracies of
CALPA-SRNet.
During calculation, the number of parameters and the num-
ber of FLOPs for every convolutional layer are determined
as follows (let | • | denotes the number of the corresponding
variable): |parameters|=|input channels|×|kernel size|×|output
channels|; |FLOPs|=|output channel size|×|parameters|.
Here our adopted “trained from scratch” scenario is
compared with the traditional “training-pruning-finetuning”
pipeline. In “training-pruning-finetuning” pipeline, the weights
in non-pruned kernels of the model were kept. Then the pruned
model was re-trained/finetuned for another 50×104 iterations.
From Tab. I we can see that with the rise of tolerable accuracy
lost ς, the parameters and FLOPs required by CALPA-SRNet
significantly decrease. However, with a mild ς (2% ∼ 20%),
the detection accuracy of the shrunken model is close to the
original SRNet. Another notable thing is that the detection
performances achieved by the shrunken models trained from
scratch are almost equivalent to those with “training-pruning-
finetuning” pipeline. Such a phenomenon indicates that in
CALPA-Net, the efficient network architecture obtained via
channel-pruning-assisted search is critical.
By contrasting the benefits of the reduction of parameters
and FLOPs with the losses of detection performance, ς is set to
5% in our final proposed framework. Please note that when ς =
5%, CALPA-SRNet achieves similar detection performance as
the original SRNet with mere 1.45% parameters (6.93×104 vs.
477.06×104) and 33.1% FLOPs (1.97×109 vs. 5.95×109). The
corresponding architecture of CALPA-SRNet can be referred
back to Fig. 1. From Fig. 1 we can see CALPA-SRNet presents
a slender bottleneck-like structure in contrast to traditional
deep-learning based steganalyzers.
However, please keep in mind that besides the complexity
of the deep-learning model itself, there are quite a few other
factors which influence the training efficiency, including access
speed of the hard disk where the data is stored in, size
of the hard disk cache/memory cache, speed of the high-
bandwidth bridge on the motherboard. In order to maximize
the benefits offered by CALPA-SRNet, high-end hardwares
such as fast SSDs (solid-state drives) are highly recommended.
Furthermore, please note that during the training procedure,
the overwhelming majority of GPU memory allocation is
used to store the input image batch and the corresponding
input/output channels of all layers, rather than the model
parameters. Therefore the superiority of CALPA-NET is its
significantly reduced parameters and FLOPs, not smaller GPU
memory allocation.
2) Tolerance to pruning rate in our approach: In Fig. 6,
we show how the validation accuracy changes with successive
growing pruning rates when determining the shrinking rate
of every inclusive convolutional layer of CALPA-SRNet. In
Algorithm 1, we just run the loop (from Line 3 to Line
19) for γl from 0% till 100%, and disable the early exit
conditions from Line 11 to Line 17 to obtain the corresponding
validation accuracies. From Fig. 6 no particular patterns can
be observed. However, no matter for ThiNet scheme (as shown
in Fig. 6(a)), or for l1-norm based scheme (as shown in
Fig. 6(b)), convolutional layers in top blocks always present
high tolerance to severe pruning rates.
3) Effectiveness of CALPA-NET compared to traditional
“training-pruning-finetuning” pipeline: In Fig. 7, we show
how the training accuracy and validation accuracy change
with successive training iterations for the original SRNet,
the corresponding CALPA-SRNet trained from scratch, and
the pruned SRNet with “training-pruning-finetuning” pipeline.
When trained to detect J-UNIWARD stego images with 0.4
bpnzAC payload and QF 75, SRNet achieved the best vali-
dation accuracy at 42.35 × 104 iterations. The corresponding
model was selected out to apply channel-pruning-assisted
search to get CALPA-SRNet. CALPA-SRNet was reset and
trained from scratch. As shown in Fig. 7, the validation
accuracies of CALPA-SRNet trained from scratch had become
stable at around 40 × 104 iterations. For comparison, training
procedure of the pruned SRNet was resumed. It was further
finetuned till 80 × 104 iterations. But it can be observed that
the validation accuracies of pruned SRNet during the finetun-
ing procedure was unstable. Furthermore, its best validation
accuracy did not surpass CALPA-SRNet trained from scratch.
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Fig. 6. Validation accuracies vs. growing pruning rates when determining the shrinking rate of every inclusive convolutional layer of CALPA-SRNet. The
trained models are aiming at detecting J-UNIWARD stego images with 0.4 bpnzAC payload and QF 75. ς = 5. (a) is for ThiNet scheme in blocks “L3”—“L12”.
(b) is for l1-norm based scheme in transformed shortcut connections of blocks “L8”—“L12”.
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Fig. 7. Comparison of the training accuracies, validation accuracies and testing accuracies vs. training iterations for the original SRNet, CALPA-SRNet
trained from scratch, and CALPA-SRNet with “training-pruning-finetuning” pipeline. The trained models are aiming at detecting J-UNIWARD stego images
with 0.4 bpnzAC payload and QF 75. ς = 5. “k” denotes the point with the highest value at the corresponding plot.
10
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
False Positive Rate
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Tr
ue
 P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
Original / 0.2 bpnzAC
CALPA / 0.2 bpnzAC
Original / 0.4 bpnzAC
CALPA / 0.4 bpnzAC
(a)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
False Positive Rate
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Tr
ue
 P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
Original / 0.2 bpnzAC
CALPA / 0.2 bpnzAC
Original / 0.4 bpnzAC
CALPA / 0.4 bpnzAC
(b)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
False Positive Rate
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Tr
ue
 P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
Original / UERD
CALPA / UERD
Original / J-UNIWARD
CALPA / J-UNIWARD
(c)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
False Positive Rate
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Tr
ue
 P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
Original / 0.2 bpp
CALPA / 0.2 bpp
Original / 0.4 bpp
CALPA / 0.4 bpp
(d)
Fig. 8. Comparison of testing accuracy of CALPA-SRNet and the corresponding original SRNet. (a) The trained models are aiming at detecting J-UNIWARD
stego images with QF 75. (b) Aiming at detecting UERD stego images with QF 75. (c) Aiming at detecting UERD/J-UNIWARD stego images with 0.4
bpnzAC payload and QF 95. (d) Aiming at detecting HILL spatial-domain stego images with 0.2/0.4 bpp payload.
C. Detection performance of CALPA-NET
In Fig. 8, we compare the detection performance of CALPA-
SRNet and the corresponding original SRNet. From Fig. 8(a)
and Fig. 8(b) we can see that CALPA-SRNet obtains compa-
rable detection performance when aiming at detecting JPEG
stego images with QF 75 (drops a bit with J-UNIWARD/0.2
bpnzAC). The detection performance of CALPA-SRNet is
slightly worse than original SRNet when JPEG stego images
are with QF 95, as shown in Fig. 8(c). Fig. 8(d) indicates that
when used to detect 0.4 bpp HILL spatial-domain stego im-
ages, CALPA-SRNet can also obtain almost the same detection
performance. Please note that all the above high performance
of CALPA-SRNet are achieved with mere 1%∼3% parameters
compared to original SRNet.
In Fig. 9, we show the corresponding shrinking rates of
CALPA-SRNets used in Fig. 8. From Fig. 9 we can observe
that the shrinking rate of every convolutional layer adapts to
the target steganographic scheme, the embedding payload, the
embedding domain and even the actual quality factor used in
JPEG target images. In general, the shrinking rate reduces as
the level of the corresponding convolutional layer gets higher
and higher. Significantly low shrinking rates can always be
observed in top convolutional layers.
In Tab. II, we compare the detection performance of
CALPA-XuNet2 and original XuNet2. We adopt an alterna-
tive performance measure used in [26]: the false-alarm rate
for a given stego-image detection probability. For instance,
PFA(30%) denotes the false-alarm rate for 30% stego-image
detection probability. From Tab. II, by looking into all the
false-alarm rates with stego-image detection probability step-
ping from 30% to 50% and then to 70%, it is clear that on
the whole, there is no distinction between the detection per-
formance of CALPA-XuNet2 and that of XuNet2. The results
demonstrate the amazing detection performance of CALPA-
XuNet2 since it is quite a lightweight model compared to
original XuNet2. The architecture of one of the CALPA-
XuNet2 models aiming at detecting J-UNIWARD stego images
with 0.4 bpnzAC payload and QF 75 can be found in Fig. 1,
in which we can see CALPA-XuNet2 also presents a slender
bottleneck-like structure.
D. Adaptivity, Transferability, and Scalability of CALPA-NET
As demonstrated in prior experiments, the structure of
CALPA-NET is adaptive to the actual targets it aims at due to
the fact that CALPA-NET is data-driven. Firstly in Fig. 10, we
evaluate the effectiveness of the adaptive data-driven scheme
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Fig. 9. The corresponding shrinking rates of CALPA-SRNets used in Fig. 8. (a) is for ThiNet scheme in blocks “L3”—“L12”. (b) is for l1-norm based
scheme in transformed shortcut connections of blocks “L8”—“L12”.
TABLE II
Comparison of detection performance of CALPA-XuNet2 and the corresponding original XuNet2. The detection performance is measured via false-alarm
rate for a given stego-image detection probability. Results for J-UNIWARD/UERD stego images with 0.2/0.4 bpnzAC payload and QF 75/95 are included.
CALPA-XuNet2 XuNet2
Quality Factors Targets PFA(70%) PFA(50%) PFA(30%) PFA(70%) PFA(50%) PFA(30%)
QF75
J-UNIWARD
0.2 bpnzAC 1.54% 0.30% 0.12% 1.06% 0.13% 0%
0.4 bpnzAC 0.1% 0.02% 0.01% 0.15% 0.04% 0.02%
UERD
0.2 bpnzAC 0.91% 0.12% 0.02% 0.7% 0.14% 0.04%
0.4 bpnzAC 0% 0% 0% 0.07% 0% 0%
QF95
J-UNIWARD
0.2 bpnzAC 36.16% 17.64% 3.28% 41.36% 22.69% 7.06%
0.4 bpnzAC 1.06% 0.06% 0% 0.72% 0.06% 0%
UERD
0.2 bpnzAC 6.62% 0.66% 0.02% 4.64% 0.54% 0.06%
0.4 bpnzAC 0.46% 0.09% 0.02% 0.46% 0.10% 0.05%
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Fig. 10. Comparison of testing accuracy of CALPA-SRNet with two less adaptive alternative schemes, the AGGR scheme and the AVG scheme. (a) For
J-UNIWARD stego images with 0.4 bpnzAC payload and QF 75. (b)For HILL stego images with 0.4 bpp payload.
used in CALPA-NET taking CALPA-SRNet as example. Here
two less adaptive alternative schemes are introduced:
• AGGR scheme: The global shrinking rate of all the
inclusive convolutional layers is aggressively set to the
minimal one determined in the CALPA-NET bottom-up
traversal.
• AVG scheme: The global shrinking rate of all the inclu-
sive convolutional layers is set to the average of all the
determined shrinking rates.
Refer back to the CALPA-SRNet illustrated in Fig. 1, the
global shrinking rate can be obtained as 5% and 56% for
AGGR scheme and AVG scheme respectively. From Fig. 10
we can see though AGGR scheme has the least parameters and
FLOPs, its detection performance degrades remarkably. AVG
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Fig. 11. Detection performance of CALPA-SRNet when applied to another targets. “JU” in the legend is short for J-UNIWARD steganographic algorithm.
(a) The architecture is original aiming at J-UNIWARD stego images with 0.4 bpnzAC payload and QF 75. (b) The architecture is original aiming at HILL
stego images with 0.4 bpp payload.
scheme possesses similar scale of parameters and FLOPs as
CALPA-SRNet, but no longer has bottleneck-like structure. Its
detection performance is close to CALPA-SRNet. However,
it is still a bit inferior to CALPA-SRNet when aiming at J-
UNIWARD stego images.
Next, we investigate the transferability of the obtained
architecture of CALPA-NET. Firstly we take the CALPA-
SRNet architecture aiming at J-UNIWARD stego images with
0.4 bpnzAC payload and QF 75 as target. From Fig. 11(a)
it is clear that the CALPA-SRNet architecture obtains good
detection performance in the three mismatched scenarios.
Furthermore, the specific JPEG-oriented CALPA-SRNet ar-
chitecture remains effective for spatial-domain HILL stego
images, implying that HILL and J-UNIWARD share some
intrinsic characteristics although they are in completely dif-
ferent domain. Oppositely, we also take the CALPA-SRNet
architecture aiming at HILL stego images in spatial domain
with 0.4 bpp payload as target. Fig. 11(b) shows its detection
performance on the three JPEG domain scenarios. We can
see that the CALPA-SRNet architecture originally for spatial
domain scenario is still effective on the three diverse JPEG do-
main scenarios, which implies that our proposed CALPA-NET
approach presents a cross-domain universal characteristics.
We then investigate the transferability of the trained
CALPA-NET model. In Tab. III we compare the detection
performance of CALPA-SRNet and original SRNet trained on
one target and tested on another target. In order to make a
fair comparison, we used the following performance measure-
ment (as in Tab. II of [26]): PE = minPFA
1
2 (PFA +PMD), where
PFA and PMD are the false alarm rate and miss detection rate.
From Tab. III it can be clearly observed that when the payload
of the targets are the same, CALPA-SRNet achieves similar,
and even better transferability compared with original SRNet.
At last the scalability of CALPA-NET is investigated. We
firstly demonstrate the performance of CALPA-SRNet on the
subset of ImageNet CLS-LOC dataset, which is of great cover
source diversity. From Fig. 12 we can see even in a tenfold
larger dataset, CALPA-SRNet still shows similar validation
and testing performance compared to original SRNet. Please
note that the gap between training accuracies and validation
accuracies for original SRNet is much bigger than that for
CALPA-SRNet, indicating that CALPA-SRNet may be less
vulnerable to overfitting the training set.
Then we evaluate the performance of CALPA-SRNet on
ALASKA, which is of great stego source diversity. For
the 80,005 ALASKA images, the train/validation/test dataset
partition is 35,000/5,000/40,005. Following the configura-
tion in [44], three more JPEG steganographic algorithms,
UED [46], EBS [47] and nsF5 [48] were used, alongside
with J-UNIWARD. The probability of using each of the
steganographic algorithms above was 30%, 15%, 15% and
40%, respectively. The corresponding embedding rate was
0.25 bpnzAC, 0.25 bpnzAC, 0.05 bpnzAC and 0.4 bpnzAC,
respectively 6.
From Fig. 13(a), we can see SRNet achieved the best valida-
tion accuracy at 55.3311 × 104 iterations. The CALPA-SRNet
architecture obtained from it could become stable at around
40 × 104 iteration when trained from scratch. The highest
validation accuracy of CALPA-SRNet was at the same level
as that of the original SRNet. Compared to Fig. 7, we can see
that on ALASKA dataset, the validation accuracies of CALPA-
SRNet trained from scratch are obviously higher than the
pruned SRNet with traditional “training-pruning-finetuning”
pipeline. For the sake of completeness, the testing accuracies
of the three models with the best validation accuracy are also
reported here—CALPA-SRNet: 78.73%; the pruned SRNet
with “training-pruning-finetuning” pipeline: 77.53%; original
SRNet: 78.42%.
The conceptual structure of the corresponding CALPA-
SRNet model is illustrated in Fig. 13(b). Compared with the
conceptual structure of CALPA-SRNet in Fig. 1, we can see
that though there are certain differences, the CALPA-SRNet
for ALASKA also presents a slender bottleneck-like structure.
6The default embedding rates in the ALASKA embedding script were
adopted since the logs of processing pipelines have not been provided for
ALASKA v2.
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TABLE III
Detection performance of CALPA-SRNet and original SRNet trained on one target and then tested on another target. The payload of the targets were
fixed to 0.4 bpnzAC/bpp. The detection performance was measured with total error probability PE .
JPEG domain Spatial domain
CALPA-SRNet
Trained on
Tested on
J-UNIWARD UERD
Trained on
Tested on
S-UNIWARD HILL
J-UNIWARD 7.5% 5.64% S-UNIWARD 10.63% 26.03%
UERD 24.2% 3.17% HILL 23.89% 14.63%
SRNet
Trained on
Tested on
J-UNIWARD UERD
Trained on
Tested on
S-UNIWARD HILL
J-UNIWARD 7.02% 5.35% S-UNIWARD 12.75% 26.99%
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Fig. 12. Comparison of the training accuracies, validation accuracies and testing accuracies vs. training iterations for CALPA-SRNet and the corresponding
original SRNet on a subset of CLS-LOC dataset. The trained models are aiming at detecting J-UNIWARD/UERD stego images with 0.4 bpnzAC payload and
QF 75. The blue dashed line in every sub-figure marks the highest testing accuracy achieved by the trained model. (a) CALPA-SRNet, aiming at J-UNIWARD;
(b) Original SRNet, aiming at J-UNIWARD; (c) CALPA-SRNet, aiming at UERD; (d) Original SRNet, aiming at UERD.
As a result, compared with original SRNet, it is only with
1.97% parameters (9.22×104) and 36.5% FLOPs (2.17×109).
E. Further discussion: why train CALPA-NETs from scratch
Putting all the experimental evidences together, the reasons
for training CALPA-NETs from scratch are provided as fol-
lows:
Firstly, in view of detection performance, training CALPA-
NETs from scratch is better than finetuning it. In Tab. I,
it is clear that the detection performance of CALPA-SRNet
trained from scratch is slightly better than finetuning it on
BOSSBase+BOWS2 dataset, when tolerable accuracy lost ς
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Fig. 13. (a) Comparison of the training accuracies and validation accuracies vs. training iterations for the original SRNet, CALPA-SRNet trained from scratch,
and CALPA-SRNet with “training-pruning-finetuning” pipeline on ALASKA dataset. “k” denotes the point with the highest value at the corresponding plot.
(b) The conceptual structure of the corresponding CALPA-SRNet model.
is low. On ALASKA dataset, a larger and more diverse
dataset, the detection performance of CALPA-SRNet trained
from scratch is obviously better than the pruned SRNet with
“training-pruning-finetuning” pipeline.
Secondly, in view of training efficiency, training CALPA-
NETs from scratch is better than finetuning it. Fig. 7 shows
that on BOSSBase+BOWS2 dataset, the validation accuracies
of pruned SRNet during the finetuning procedure was unstable.
We can see more distinct efficiency difference on the ALASKA
dataset. As shown in Fig. 13(a), even the best validation
obtained by the pruned SRNet at further 85.7304 × 104 itera-
tions ((85.7304+55.3311)×104 = 141.0615×104) was inferior.
As comparison, the validation accuracies of CALPA-SRNet
trained from scratch became stable at around 40×104 iterations
and achieved the peak at mere 76.3263 × 104 iterations.
Thirdly and the most importantly, the effectiveness of
CALPA-NETs trained from scratch demonstrates what matters
most is the cost-effective architecture obtained by CALPA-
NET approach, rather than the preserved parameters in the
pruned steganalytic models. Furthermore, Fig. 11 demonstrates
that CALPA-NET architecture presents general applicability.
Fig. 13(a) also demonstrates that there exists an effective slen-
der bottleneck-like CALPA-SRNet architecture under the stego
source diversity scenario. Therefore, the users can absolutely
apply one versatile CALPA-NET architecture to multiple ste-
ganalytic scenarios and train it from scratch adaptively with
limited budget. Such an ability is impossible for traditional
three-stage training-pruning-finetuning pipeline.
IV. Concluding remarks
In this paper we propose CALPA-NET, which is aiming at
adaptively search efficient network structure on top of existing
over-parameterized and vast deep-learning based steganalyz-
ers. The major contributions of this work are as follows:
• We have observed that the broad inverted-pyramid struc-
ture of existing deep-learning based steganalyzers can-
not boost detection performance even with fifty fold
parameter. A theoretical reflection is proposed to argue
that such structure might contradict the well-established
model diversity oriented philosophy.
• We have proposed a channel-pruning-assisted deep resid-
ual network architecture search approach which uses
a hybrid criterion combined with ThiNet and l1-norm
based network pruning scheme. In the proposed network
architecture, the traditional training-pruning-finetuning
network pruning pipeline is completed abandoned.
• The extensive experiments conducted on de-facto bench-
marking image datasets show that CALAP-NET can
achieve comparative detection performance with just a
few percent of the model size and a small proportion of
computational cost.
Our future work will focus on two aspects: (1) development
of a fast adaptive structural adjustment algorithm to make
deep-learning based steganalyzers self adapt to targets with-
out the introduction of redundant parameters/components; (2)
further exploration of the feasibility of completely automatic
deep-learning based steganalytic framework generation.
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Appendix A
Theoretical reflection
In the CNN pipeline, given a convolutional layer Ll, let
us start from (1). Let O jk:: = Ẑ
l−1
j:: ∗ Wljk::, then Zlk:: =∑J
j=1O jk::, 1 ≤ k ≤ Kl. Assume that O jk:: is a discrete
sample drawn from a continuous latent distribution O jk, with
PDF (Probability Distribution Function) o jk. Accordingly, let
Zlk:: be a sample of the latent distribution Zk with PDF zk.
Please note that the PDF of the aggregation is equal to the
convolution of the PDF of the aggregated terms:
zk = o1k ∗ o2k ∗ · · · ∗ o jk ∗ · · · ∗ oJk︸                                ︷︷                                ︸
1≤ j≤J
(3)
Denote the Fourier transform of o jk and zk as O jk and Zk,
respectively. Therefore in frequency domain, we can get:
Z k(ω) =
J∏
j=1
O jk(ω) (4)
Given two frequencies ω1 and ω2, assume that for a fixed
k, O jk in ω1 contains sparse intensity fluctuations, while in ω2
contains strong intensities. Therefore for most j, |O jk(ω1)| 
|O jk(ω2)|. Obviously, for large enough J:
|Z k(ω1)|
|Z k(ω2)| =
∣∣∣∏Jj=1 O jk(ω1)∣∣∣∣∣∣∏Jj=1 O jk(ω2)∣∣∣ =
∏J
j=1 |O jk(ω1)|∏J
j=1 |O jk(ω2)|
−→ 0 (5)
From (5) we can see the aggregation in (1) with large enough
J suppresses sparse intensity fluctuations as well as heightens
strong intensities in low-frequency subbands of Zlk::, 1 ≤ k ≤
Kl.
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